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ABSTRACT 
 
NASA is investigating a range of future human spaceflight missions, including both Mars-distance and Near Earth 
Object (NEO) targets. Of significant importance for these missions is the balance between crew autonomy and vehicle 
automation. As distance from Earth results in increasing communication delays, future crews need both the capability 
and authority to independently make decisions.   However, small crews cannot take on all functions performed by 
ground today, and so vehicles must be more automated to reduce the crew workload for such missions.  
NASA’s Advanced Exploration Systems Program funded Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) project conducted 
an autonomous command and control experiment on-board the International Space Station that demonstrated single 
action intelligent procedures for crew command and control.  The target problem was to enable crew initialization of 
a facility class rack with power and thermal interfaces, and involving core and payload command and telemetry 
processing, without support from ground controllers. This autonomous operations capability is enabling in scenarios 
such as initialization of a medical facility to respond to a crew medical emergency, and representative of other 
spacecraft autonomy challenges. The experiment was conducted using the Expedite the Processing of Experiments for 
Space Station (EXPRESS) rack 7, which was located in the Port 2 location within the U.S Laboratory onboard the 
International Space Station (ISS).  Activation and deactivation of this facility is time consuming and operationally 
intensive, requiring coordination of three flight control positions, 47 nominal steps, 57 commands, 276 telemetry 
checks, and coordination of multiple ISS systems (both core and payload). Utilization of Draper Laboratory’s  
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Timeliner software, deployed on-board the ISS within the Command and Control (C&C) computers and the Payload 
computers, allowed development of the automated procedures specific to ISS without having to certify and employ 
novel software for procedure development and execution. The procedures contained the ground procedure logic and 
actions as possible to include fault detection and recovery capabilities. The autonomous operations concept includes a 
reduction of the amount of data a crew operator is required to verify during activation or de-activation, as well as 
integration of procedure execution status and relevant data in a single integrated display. During execution, the auto-
procedures (via Timerliner) provide a step-by-step messaging paradigm and a high-level status upon termination. 
This messaging and high-level status is the only data generated for operator display. To enhance situational awareness 
of the operator, the Web-based Procedure Display (WebPD) provides a novel approach to the issues of procedure 
display and execution tracking. WebPD is a web based application that serves as the user interface for electronic 
procedure execution. It incorporates several aspects of the HTML5 standard. Procedures are written in a dialect of 
XML called Procedure Representation Language (PRL).  WebPD tracks execution status in the procedure or 
procedures being displayed.  WebPD aggregates and simplifies the auto-sequence execution status information, and 
formatted to be easily followed and understood by an operator who is not dedicated to actively monitoring the task.  
WebPD also provides an integrated data and control interface to pause or halt the execution in order to provide a 
check point of operation and to examine progress before starting the next sequence of activities. For this 
demonstration, the procedure was initiated and monitored from the ground. As the Timeliner sequences executed, 
their high-level execution status was written to PLMDM memory. This memory is read and downlinked via Ku-Band 
at a 1 Hz rate. The data containing the high-level execution status is de-commutated on the ground, and rebroadcast 
for WebPD consumption.  A future demonstration will be performed onboard, with ISS astronauts initiating the 
operations instead of ground controllers. The AMO EXPRESS experiment demonstrated activation and de-activation 
of EXPRESS rack 7, providing the capability of future single button activations and deactivations of facility class 
racks.  The experiment achieved numerous technical and operations ‘firsts’ for the ISS 
 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
For over 50 years, NASA’s crewed missions have been confined to the Earth-Moon system, where speed-of-light 
communications delays between crew and ground are practically nonexistent.  The close proximity of the crew to the Earth 
has enabled NASA to operate human space missions primarily from the ground. This “ground-centered” mode of operations 
has had several advantages: by having a large team of the people involved on the ground, the on-board crew could be smaller, 
the vehicles could be simpler and lighter, and the mission performed for a lower cost.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Human spaceflight destinations in the Solar System, approximate distance from Earth, and approximate 
one-way light time delay. 
 
NASA is now investigating a range of future human spaceflight missions that includes a variety of Martian destinations and a 
range of Near Earth Object (NEO) targets.  These possibilities are summarized in Table 1.  The table shows the approximate 
distance between the destination and the Earth, where the control center will be located, and the one-way light-time delay 
between the destination and Earth. As is evident from Table 1, future missions will be of much longer duration, and put crews 
much further from Earth, than today’s missions. Accordingly, NASA has recently funded a number of projects to develop 
and test operations concepts for these future missions.  Of significant importance is the balance between crew autonomy and 
vehicle automation.  Future crews need both the authority to make decisions without inefficient communication back and 
forth with ground-based mission control. They will also need sufficient information and vehicle capability to make, and 
implement, those decisions.  However, small crews cannot take on all functions performed by ground today, and so vehicles 
must be more automated to reduce the number of tasks crews are responsible for. 
 
Destination Earth Distance 
(km) 
1-way Time 
delay (s) 
Lunar 38,400,000 1.3 
NEOs (close) variable variable 
Mars (close) 545,000,000 181.6 
Mars 
(opposition) 
4,013,000,000 1337.6 
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Current and prior work in this area includes crew autonomy experiments onboard ISS: 
- Crew Autonomous Procedures [3]; astronauts performed numerous human spaceflight procedures without assistance 
from MCC, resulting in guidelines on the writing of these procedures. 
- The AMO experiment; an ongoing experiment in transitioning responsibility for two ISS subsystems (water quality 
analysis hardware and crew laptops) to astronauts, with the aid of software tools.  
- Crew Self Scheduling; a future experiment to evaluate tools for astronauts to schedule their own daily activity plans. 
 
Previous work in this area also includes ISS automation: 
- Payload operations automation [5];  A variety of ISS payloads were automated early in its operational lifetime.  
- Optimal Propellant Maneuvers and Zero Propellant Maneuvers [2]; a special trajectory accomplished only using ISS’ 
Control Moment Gyros (CMGs) was implemented using ground-based automation. 
 
The experiment described in this paper demonstrates a transfer of authority from mission control to the crew in a similar 
spirit to the ISS Crew Autonomous Procedures experiment [3].  However, the system in question (an EXPRESS rack onboard 
ISS) has rich electronic command and telemetry interfaces, and thus is amenable to automation, as is used in previous 
payload autonomous operations.   
Unlike prior work, the system in question spans both spacecraft core systems (power, thermal, and life support) and 
payloads (science).  Also unlike prior work, the capability provided will ultimately allow crew to take as much control as 
desired (so-called adjustable autonomy). 
 
II.      Operations Concept 
 
 The driving scenario for developing the operations concept is an unscheduled crew activation of a facility 
class rack, on a manned deep space mission with large communications delays, due to a crew medical emergency. 
With large communication delays, the crew would require the capability to autonomously activate the facility. 
Utilizing the ISS as a test-bed for such a command and control experiment, the EXPRESS Rack systems in the U.S. 
Lab were chosen as potential operating targets. The analysis of payloads resident within each EXPRESS Rack in the 
U.S. Lab, showed that EXPRESS Rack 7 was not continuously powered, and hence would provide a good target for 
autonomous activation and de-activation with no impact to payload operations. The analysis of ground command 
procedures that are required to be executed for EXPRESS rack operations and the division of responsibilities for 
activation/deactivation between MCC-H and Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) resulted in an 
operations concept of intelligent functions that could be executed independently and with a single operator action. 
The division of the functions corresponds to the three mission operations positions responsible for executing the 
ground procedure, and also allows independent testing of the functions. The functions are Thermal Control, Power, 
Rack Boot-up Monitoring, Smoke Detection and Closeout functions for rack activation. For Rack De-activation, 
there would be only one operator action and hence one function to be executed. This concept would augment crew 
capabilities as it pertained to unplanned activation of a medical facility during a crew emergency. Automation 
onboard the ISS is accomplished by software running on MDMs (avionics computers). The concept required core 
commands to be sent from the Payload MDM (PLMDM) to the Command and Control MDM (CNCMDM) with the 
corresponding end item verification, as well as commands being sent to the PLMDM and EXPRESS Rack 7.  
As the on-board scripting language for ISS, Timeliner was selected for the implementation of the concept. The 
Timeliner auto-procedures would be required to perform verification prior to sending a command as well as 
validation after sending the command. Fault detection would be embedded in the same manner as the Autonomous 
Fluid Transfer System [1], with recovery if possible. It must be noted that the EXPRESS systems were not designed 
for autonomous operations and it is not possible to recover from all failures.  
The concept also includes a reduction of the amount of data a crew operator is required to verify during 
activation or de-activation, as well as integration of procedure execution status and relevant data in a single 
integrated display. During execution, the auto-procedures (via Timerliner) provide a step by step messaging 
paradigm and would provide a high-level status upon termination. This messaging and high-level status would be 
the only data generated for operator display. To enhance situational awareness of the operator, the Web-based 
Procedure Display (WebPD) provides a novel approach to the issues of procedure display and execution tracking.  
WebPD is under continuous development by NASA and has been employed in a variety of advanced technology 
experiments over the last several years[4,7].  Specifically, WebPD aggregates and simplifies the auto-sequence 
execution status information, and formatted to be easily followed and understood by an operator who is not 
dedicated to actively monitoring the task.  WebPD also provides an integrated data and control interface to pause/ 
halt the execution in order to provide a check point of operation and to examine progress before starting the next 
sequence of activities.  In this experiment, a two stage approach was chosen for WebPD execution, with the first a 
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“Follow Execution Only” approach, where the high-level status would simply be “followed” by WebPD on the 
ground, with the display of status and messages and the actual Timeliner sequences being started by the Payload 
Rack Officer via ground command. The second stage would involve WebPD being located on-board an ISS PCS 
attached to a payload local 1553 bus and commanding the Timeliner sequences, thus giving a changing locus of 
control to the crew for the same auto-procedures. The architecture diagram for the first stage operational concept is 
shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - AMO EXPRESS Context Diagram 
 
III.     Auto-Procedure Design 
 
Prior experience with ISS Timeliner and the data and command interfaces provided the first hurdles that needed 
to be overcome before procedure development could begin.   Not all core side commands and their end item 
verifications were available at the PLMDM, where Timeliner execution would take place. There were 5 thermal 
control commands, two remote power control module switch commands, two smoke detector commands and the 
corresponding end item telemetry for command verification that were required for execution from the core side 
console positions. All commands for the PLMDM and EXPRESS 7 were available to Timeliner negating any on-
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board changes on the payload side. With the identification of the missing commands and telemetry that were needed 
from the core side of ISS, we created and submitted two software change requests to the ISS Avionics Software 
Control Board (ASCB) to facilitate access to the missing commands and telemetry at the PLMDM as we began the 
procedure development. The ISS is essentially divided between core side operations and payload side operations 
which drives the command procedures to be “joint procedures” when multiple disciplines are involved.  The initial 
design encompassed all the functions within one Timeliner bundle (executable file), which was later divided into 
two bundles, one for the core side functions (sequences) and one for the payload side functions (sequences). This 
turned out to be of great advantage as it separated the core side commands from the payload side commands and 
each could be tested separately at different facilities. This also enhanced procedure safety by further reducing the 
risk of inadvertent commanding. Each sequence performs one function as follows: 
THERMAL Sequence – Rack Flow Control Assembly (RFCA) commanding and validation 
POWER – Power Control Switch commanding and validation. 
SMOKE – Smoke Detector commanding and validation. 
INITDRIVES – Rack Boot-up Monitoring and rack validation 
ACTCLOSEOUT – Rack activation closeouts (data downlinks) 
DEACTIVATION – Complete rack deactivation commanding. 
These are the main functional sequences. In addition, a TELEMETRYCHECK sequence was created to scan all the 
telemetry a Payload Rack Officer views to determine any anomalies after a rack boot-up. This sequence would 
return a count of errors detected, directing the Payload Rack Officer to view the EXPRESS 7 displays for the details. 
The MANUALCONFIG sequence was created to directly command the configuration of the rack for locker/drawer 
locations, communications and health and status when failures to both the Express Memory Unit (EMU) and Laptop 
occur and the Rack Interface Controller (RIC) configuration files could not be loaded. This command sequence 
becomes the one and only payload sequence that must be modified when the payload complement for the rack is 
changed.  
During analysis of the ground command procedures, we noticed that there were a couple of failures within the 
procedures that could occur if the rack activation was not pre-coordinated with RFCA Software execution, Remote 
Power Control (RPC) Close/Open Inhibits, and the Rack Power Switch being in the off position. We had no control 
of whether the RFCA software was in execution, nor did we have or ask for the inhibit removal commands as we did 
not believe we could receive ISS Safety permission for these. In all of the cases, we could message the crew/ground 
for corrective action to the condition (which shouldn’t exist if it was pre-coordinated), and monitor the end items for 
a period of time before terminating with an error or continuing on when corrected within the specified time. The real 
solution to removing these failure points is to obtain the Inhibit commands for inclusion in the sequences. In this 
way external interaction is further removed. The only hard failure we would not be able to work around 
programmatically would be the manual rack power switch, which requires a crew member to physically toggle, but 
in all cases when we encountered a detectable and correctable failure that the sequences could not correct 
themselves, the sequences message the action to take to the ground and crew, and monitor for the action to occur for 
10 minute time periods. If the corrective action occurs, the sequence will continue, but if the corrective actions do 
not occur within the 10 minute monitoring period, the sequence would will, return a failure status code, and 
terminate.   
There would be a specific order the sequences must be executed in and each sequence must complete and return 
with the single “GO” status return in order for the next sequence in the procedure to be started. Each sequence is re-
entrant, so that if any errors occur which are not programmed for monitoring in the fault detection sections of the 
procedure, ground control could take-over, correct the condition and simply re-start the sequence that was in 
execution when the fault occurred. To identify all the known faults, analysis of all the payload anomaly reports was 
performed and also, it was decided that all devices/systems being commanded would be “state” checked prior to 
command transmittal and validated after command receipt. This added to the total number of faults being detected, 
but is required when performing autonomous commanding and autonomous procedures. One fall-out of this 
decision/requirement pertained to the increased number of status code returns from each sequence, but it did give 
detailed specific fault information to the operator.  
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Another hurdle we had to resolve was the high-level status codes the sequences would return from execution and 
how to transmit this data to the ground (and, eventually, to a computer onboard ISS running the WebPD). This was 
accomplished by receiving data written to a PLMDM memory allocation. This memory, called the HAL reserve, is 
write-accessible for Timeliner and downlinked automatically via Ku Band at a 1Hz rate. As this data is already 
being processed by the HOSC at Marshall Space Flight Center, no additional ground changes would be required to 
support the high-level status transmission from ISS. Since the data is written to PLMDM memory, the data would 
also be available for transmission to a 1553 connected Personal Computer System (PCS) onboard ISS, which would 
support the stage two operations concept.  Transmittal of the data to the WebPD application is then a simple matter 
of defining a packet, listing the data to be transmitted and then executing the GSE Packet service provided as a 
standard HOSC user capability.  A GSE packet is an Enhanced HOSC System / Consultative Committee for Space 
Data Systems (EHS/CCSDS) formatted data transmission. The data would be transmitted via Ethernet to specific 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and ports. After final development of the AMO EXPRESS Bundles, only 23 high-
level status items were required, reducing the amount of telemetry an operator is required to look at for EXPRESS 
rack activation and deactivation by a very large amount.  
 
IV.    Development and Test 
 
Procedure development began with translating the ground command procedures into Timeliner procedure 
sequences. The first function developed was the THERMAL control sequence and the identification of the Program 
Unique Identifier’s (PUI’s) to determine the Rack Flow Control Assembly (RFCA) software state (was the 
monitoring software started and in execution?), the current RFCA state (current mode?), sending the correct mode 
commands to initiate flow, determining when the flow rate was within range and finally monitoring the valve 
movement to command the lock-in of the flow rate. The flow rate set point utilized was 50 Kg per hour.  
The second function to be developed was the POWER sequence which would apply power to EXPRESS Rack 7. 
This sequence verified the status of the specific remote power control module, and the Remote Power Control 
switch (RPC) before commanding the RPC to a closed position. Initially we were to power the rack via main and 
aux RPC’s, but we encountered a bundle memory limit restriction (procedure too large) and the decision was made 
to only power via the Main RPC for procedure reduction.  
The third function to be developed was the smoke detection enablement sequence, SMOKE. The sequence 
encompassed the verification of the smoke detection status, monitoring of the scatter and obscuration values and 
calculating the % trip value to determine if it was safe to command the smoke detector enablement. Enabling the 
smoke detector with obscuration and scatter limits exceeded would immediately sound a fire alarm.  
The fourth function to be developed was the rack boot-up monitoring sequence, INITDRIVES. This was the first 
payload side sequence to be developed which monitored the boot-up from power-up that included monitoring the 
configuration file loads, retrieval drive operations and correcting any configuration anomalies. If no retrieval drives 
were available (such as a failed EXPRESS Memory Unit or failed or unattached Lap top), the Manual Configuration 
sequence would be initiated to command the configuration of the rack and its payloads.  
After a successful rack boot-up, the Payload Rack Officer (PRO) performs many commanded actions for a final 
health and status check of the rack. These actions were developed into the Activation Closeout sequence, 
ACTCLOSEOUT, which would be the final sequence to be executed for rack activation. During auto-procedure 
development, the high-level status return codes were populated where each possible failure that was programmed for 
had a specific code, and only one success code would be defined for each sequence. In this way, the status return 
codes would point to a specific error condition and operations direction would be given for the response. Upon any 
status return, messages were generated in two downlink data streams providing informative descriptions of the error 
and the direct action to be taken by operators if any. 
WebPD is a web based application that serves as the user interface for electronic procedure execution. It 
incorporates several aspects of the HTML5 standard. Procedures are written in a dialect of XML called Procedure 
Representation Language (PRL) [6].  WebPD operates in conjunction with PRLExecutive, which tracks execution 
status in the procedure or procedures being displayed.  The WebPD procedure for AMO EXPRESS was developed 
at JSC and simply contained the sequences to be executed in “step” order.  WebPD interfaces directly with 
PRLExecutive and indirectly with Timeliner via the GSE packet telemetry, as described in Figure 1. As a direct 
client to the PRLExecutive, WebPD is responsible for displaying procedure execution status as they are published. 
Also, when needed, PRLExecutive prompts the user for input. WebPD is responsible for displaying these user 
queries and providing a means of responding. Figure 4 below shows the WebPD following the execution of the 'seq 
master' procedure. Telemetry is displayed in the ovals, the dimmed lines are denoting completed steps, and the 
purple bar indicates the current location of the procedure execution. 
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FIGURE 2 – WEBPD DISPLAY 
 
To serve AMO Express functions, WebPD monitors the executing Timeliner sequence by tracking the high-level 
status returns, and autonomously follows the execution progress until the completion of the Timeliner sequence.  
The GSE data packet definition to support the WebPD application contained the program unique identifiers that the 
Timeliner sequences populated during execution providing the high-level status and messages. The packet definition 
is utilized by the HOSC to build and send data packets to remote installations. Our goal here was to define the data 
needed by WebPD to support both the ground “follow only” mode and the on-board “command” mode without 
making any changes to the data definition or the order of the data within the packet.  
The WebPD application was delivered to MSFC to execute on a PC platform with Windows 7. The application 
reads CCSDS packet data over a UDP port. Once logged into the HOSC, an “AMO Operations” user initiates the 
packet generation and distribution of packets to the WebPD application via the standard HOSC GSE Operations 
capability. The IP addresses and data port identification becomes the only requirement once the packet content is 
defined. AMO operations defined and validated the packet definition and assigned a unique format identifier. The 
GSE Operations capability also allows the user the ability to “watch” packet transmission which provided and end to 
end monitoring capability of the data stream as each packet was displayed upon reception at the AMO workstation.  
As the Timeliner sequences executed, their high-level execution status was written to PLMDM memory (HAL 
System memory). This memory is collected and downlinked via Ku-Band at a 1 Hz rate. The PUIs utilized by AMO 
and containing the high-level execution status is de-commutated at the HOSC and the values placed in the AMO 
data packet for WebPD consumption and distributed.  WebPD requires the user to select the procedure to be 
executed, (in this case, the procedure simply follows the execution), and gives the user start/stop control. Once 
started, the AMO EXPRESS procedure reads the incoming data packets and displays the high-level execution status 
for each step in the procedure that is executed. No anomalies were ever encountered with the WebPD application, 
although a few enhancements will be submitted after AMO EXPRESS real-time operations is completed.  
In addition to the real-time AMO EXPRESS Timeliner sequences, AMO operations created a WebPD TEST 
Sequence that would generate status data. This test sequence allowed testing of WebPD without having to allocate 
and reserve Core test assets as well as EXPRESS rack 7. Table 2 depicts the WebPD procedure step correlation to 
Timeliner Sequences where each step in the procedure has a corresponding Timeliner sequence to be executed. 
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Table 2. Procedure Step to Sequence Correlation 
 
Step 1 Thermal AMOE_THERMAL 
Step 2 Power  AMOE_POWER 
Step 3 Smoke Detection AMO_SD_ENABLE 
Step 4 Rack Boot Monitor AMO_INIT_DRIVES 
Step 5 Closeouts AMOE_ACT_CLOSEOUT 
Step 6 De-activation AMOE_DEACTIVATION 
 
The Single Button activation option for the PRO/Crew is the master sequence Activate_Express7 which starts 
each sequence in WebPD “step” order and verifies the return status before starting the next sequence in the 
procedure. WebPD would receive the high-level status from the sub-ordinate sequences the same as if they had been 
executed singularly. De-activation of EXPRESS 7 is a single step and is the final sequence to be executed for the 
experiment. 
After a good procedure baseline was created of the logic flow and the core commands were received and would 
compile, we coordinated testing time.  Test sessions were divided into the core side and the Express Rack (ER) 
(payload side).  Core testing exercised use of the Rack Flow Control Assembly (RFCA), Rack Power Controller 
Module (RPCM), Rack Power Controller (RPC), and smoke detection enablement (SD).  
Testing of the core bundle was exercised using the Software Development and Integration Laboratory (SIDL) at 
JSC.  The SIDL can be configured by either using the Integrated Test Rig (ITR) or Hardware/Software Integration 
Lab (HSIL). Both facilities provide flight equivalent hardware replicating the onboard computers and network 
capabilities of the ISS. They contain a subset of the ISS architecture and can be configured to simulate connectivity 
of the Command and Control MDM (CNCMDM), Guidance Navigation and Control MDM, and the Payload 
Multiplexer-De-Multiplexer (PL MDM) as well as other combinations of Tier 2 and 3 MDM’s.  The SIDL does not 
provide access to an ER or ER equivalent. To test the ER or Payload software, we had to use facilities located at 
MSFC in the Payload Software Integration and Verification Facility (PSIVF) or the Payload Rack Checkout Unit 
(PRCU).  
AMO never scheduled dedicated test time using the SIDL and always piggy backed on others testing objectives 
at JSC and MSFC.  This was a decision to lessen the costs incurred by the project.  By not having dedicated facilities 
for AMO to test and sharing resources and test objectives some days we only got to test for an hour or less during an 
8 hour scheduled session. This was a challenging environment early on because most of the end item verifiers 
onboard were in raw counts and not calibrated data as observed on the ground.  
The RFCA water flow counts, the set point temperatures, and the smoke detection scatter and obscuration 
telemetry values were in raw counts and not calibrated.  The HOSC telemetry data base calibration coefficients were 
used to calculate the flow values and the set point values.  Smoke detection was a little more of a challenge since all 
the smoked detection enablement had been handled by the JSC ETHOS console position.  Working with ETHOS, 
we learned smoke detection was not enabled based on just scatter and obscuration, but a combination of both called 
“percent trip”. ETHOS provided us with the calculation for percent trip and we used that derived value to determine 
whether we should enable smoke detection or not.  With no way to manipulate the scatter or obscuration values in 
the models with SIDL, we wrote a C program that requested the scatter and obscuration values, calculated the 
percent trip and output it to the screen.  Several real time rack scatter and obscuration values were obtained from ISS 
and PRO requested percent trip values from ETHOS.  The values were input into the C program and we knew the 
percent trip values were correct when they matched what the ISS real time systems produced. After we knew we had 
good percent trip calculation, we could input different combinations of scatter and obscuration values to determine 
the upper acceptable threshold or enablement of smoke detection.  Basically the same method of developing a C 
program to determine the raw count ranges to determine the RFCA set-point upper range and the flow meter ranges 
were used in combination with real time data dumps to verify. 
Testing the ER bundle proved to be a little more challenging than the core side.  The ER auto-procedures had to 
be tested in either PSIVF or the PRCU.  After the bundles were compiled, we could not uplink them because critical 
ground servers for the command interface to MSFC did not exist. The file would have to be emailed to personnel 
responsible for the facilities configuration and then transferred to the PLMDM.  After the files were copied to the 
PLMDM, PRO could downlink the PLMDM directory list file and update the Auto-Procedures Ground Management 
Tool (APGMT), which is the main command and control application for Timeliner operations.  
Since the bundles were logically divided into core and payload/ER bundles, PRO could concentrate on the rack 
bundle. Not all lines of procedure steps could be tested because of system limitations. The ER subsystem flow for 
cooling and the thermal sensors located in the cooling lines had no real or simulated values associated with them.  
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We wrote C routines similar to the ones for the core side which accepted input ranges and output expected raw count 
values. The values were compared to Near Real Time (NRT) data from operating ISS racks. Nominally, all auto-
procedures must have full execution path testing, but in the case of the thermal sensor testing, there was a small 
segment of the procedure that could not be tested completely, but the C program output matching real time NRT 
data, gave us a high confidence level the rack thermal sensor check will work well.  
The PSIVF when using the qualification unit and the PRCU facility functioned identical as far as the Huntsville 
Operations Control Center (HOSC) interface with these facilities, even though, they were physically in 2 different 
locations. Both facilities consisted of a PLMDM functional equivalent unit (FEU) verified to flight data interfaces 
and running PEP flight software, an EXPRESS Laptop FEU running EXPRESS Rack Laptop flight software, a 
Payload Ethernet Hub Gateway (PEHG) FEU verified to flight interfaces (route 10Mbps Ethernet data from 
International Standard Payload Rack (ISPR) Payload simulations, verify traffic rates), and an Improved Payload 
Ethernet Hub Gateway (iPEHG) FEU verified to flight interfaces (route 100 Mbps Ethernet  data from ISPR Payload 
simulations and external, non-simulated payloads). The PRCU and PSIVF provided a CNCMDM simulator 
interface. However, it is only used to pass commands to the PL MDM.  Broadcast Ancillary Data and Payload 
Ancillary Data (BAD/PAD) are usually inhibited since there are not  core systems available to pass data to the 
CNCMDM to broadcast. By inhibiting these CNCMDM broadcast, the PRO can command data loads for this core 
data into PL MDM memory, essentially providing a data simulation from the core side. This works well when 
setting up for an execution path test. 
The HOSC provided the interface to SIDL, PSIVF, or the PRCU and received telemetry from the external 
facilities and issued commands to each of them.  We never used a flight Mission Operational Mode Project (MOP) 
configuration to insure a full test environment. The MOP’s provided for testing were always pre-mission MOP’s 
which consisted of new software releases for either Enhanced HOSC System (EHS), PIMS, EHS PC (EPC), 
telemetry database or command database upgrades.  As a result of the different combinations of HOSC upgrades, 
considerable time was lost while difficulties in system configuration issues were worked and eventually fixed, but 
all combinations of flight and ground software as well as databases were tested.  
When the HOSC and our testing facility of the day were in harmony, test objectives consisted of running each 
bundle to completion and using Payload Event viewer and displays to verify expected end items or responses. The 
Auto-Procedures Ground Management Tool (APGMT) was used to issue Timeliner hold-at, sequence resume and 
sequence step commands in order to move in and out of Timeliner specific lines of the procedure.  Not all end item 
verifications were provided in telemetry.  When there were no telemetry verifiers, we used HAL internal memory 
Program Unique Identifier’s to capture and downlink the desired value.  When a procedure change was required, we 
had to retrieve the source file from PIMS to a local drive, edit and save the procedure back to the local drive, and 
then copy the procedure back into PIMS where it could be re-compiled.  If we were in the PSIVF or using the 
PRCU, the byte swapped TLA and TLX file for each bundle we were testing would have to be emailed to the test 
engineer.  If we were testing using the SIDL, we could drop the file in the MSFC drop box and uplink it after JSC 
retrieved the file to their command server. This latter uplink operation is flight like. The process for editing, 
compiling, and getting a bundle ready to be tested again, often took much longer than it took to modify the 
procedure.  MSFC is currently working on moving the PIMS application to a share point server and will provide 
PIMS Timeliner edit capability.  This will reduce procedure modification turnaround time significantly. The final 
testing encompassed the flight databases, MOP, EHS and flight software that would be encountered during real-time 
operations on-board the ISS. 
Both test facilities, JSC and MSFC, provided challenging environments for AMO because there were always 
multiple objectives to be accomplished during the test and AMO was always the lowest priority.  The biggest 
challenge was getting the facilities setup up in a correct configuration to run our tests. The SIDL had issues with 
properly configuring the PLMDM’s and loading the Pre-Positioned Load’s (PPL’s) on the CNCMDM’s for the 
Command Request Commands (CRC) required by AMO. The PRCU and PSIVF functioned well, although, the 
biggest challenge was keeping the data base current and keeping up with configuration changes such as, EHS and 
EPC software updates, and TIMELINER compiler changes. The personnel involved were professional and always 
worked hard to get AMO in a good state to be successful. Many times because of unforeseen issues with the test rig 
or MSFC hardware or software, hours and even days produced no productivity.  If there was a test facility that 
combined the SIDL and PSIVF or PRCU into one integrated facility, testing time could be reduced to days or weeks 
verses many months. 
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V.      APPROVAL PROCESS 
Beginning in December 2012, the AMO-EXPRESS payload began the journey of development, payload 
manifestation, testing, and approvals from various ISS Boards/Management/Panels for on-orbit operations.  The 
following will summarize the excursion through various ISS Boards/Management/Panels which AMO-EXPRESS 
had to receive approvals from in order to execute on-orbit.  
In December 2012, the ISS as a Test-bed for Analog Research Joint Operations Panel (ISTAR JOP) supported 
AMO activities and received a “go-ahead” from the ISS Engineering Integration Working Group (EIWG). The 
following month, MSFC AMO presented the AMO-EXPRESS experiment idea to the MSFC Mission Operations 
Lab (MOL) Director and the Payload Operations Integration Facility (POIF) Managers and received a “go-ahead”.  
During the period of January-February 2013, MSFC AMO met several times with Payload Rack Officers (PROs) to 
discuss MSFC AMO Overview & EXPRESS Rack Topology.  After these meetings, it was determined EXPRESS 
Rack 7 would be the best EXPRESS Rack (ER) to use, for it is a non-continuous powered ER with only 1-2 
Payloads. This decision would later impact the scheduling of AMO EXPRESS operations as during the development 
time, payloads would be manifested for this experiment rack. 
During the month of March 2013, MSFC AMO presented the AMO-EXPRESS concepts and plans to EXPRESS 
Software Control Panel (ESCP).  The ESCP did not have any concerns and gave AMO the “Go Ahead”.  MSFC 
AMO met with the EXPRESS Rack Operations Lead, PROs and Data Management Coordinators (DMCs) to 
summarize AMO-EXPRESS concepts and review technical impacts, and received no concerns/issues.  During a 
telecon with the Payload Operations Directors (PODs), the AMO Project Manager, and the JSC Crew Office Chief 
Engineer, MSFC AMO briefed the Crew Office with the AMO-EXPRESS proposals.  The JSC Crew Office Chief 
Engineer was supportive of the AMO-EXPRESS proposed plans, as long as they pass all boards/safety reviews, so 
AMO-EXPRESS received positive backing from the crew office.  
In April 2013, the AMO Project Manager worked with the manager of the ISS Technology Demonstration Office 
to get AMO-EXPRESS listed in the Integrated Payload List (IPL).  AMO-EXPRESS became manifested when it 
was listed in the 04/11/13 of the ISS Payloads Office IPL.  The plans for AMO-EXPRESS were presented to the 
Technical Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) Management Control Group (HMCG), and received 
approval for AMO-EXPRESS plans.  AMO-EXPRESS Overview was presented to the ISS Research Planning 
Working Group (RPWG), and received no issues or concerns from this working group. 
During June-August 2013, AMO-EXPRESS Change Evaluation Form (CEF) 4133 for Inc 39/40 was submitted 
and approved, the AMO EXPRESS Investigation Overview and Command Utilization was presented to the ISS 
NASA/Boeing Tagup, and a Payload Integration Agreement (PIA) for AMO-EXPRESS was submitted and 
approved.  In August 2013, AMO-EXPRESS presented the AMO Ethernet Commanding Overview to the ISS Safety 
Review Panel (SRP), Special Topic Meeting.  The result of this meeting was that the Payload Timeliner Process 
needed to be updated to include the process of issuing a Crit 2 Core Command in the Payload Timeliner Bundles, so 
AMO-EXPRESS worked with the ISS Computer Safety Panel and the Timeliner Operation Review Panel (TORP) 
and Safety Representative to get this change added.  AMO-EXPRESS presented Software Change Request (SCR) 
41920 (CCS PAD PPL to Support Payloads AMO EXPRESS) and SCR 41963 (PLMDM Command Requirements 
Required for AMO EXPRESS) to the ISS Software Change and Schedule Review Panel (SCRCP), and AMO-
EXPRESS received approval to proceed to the Avionics Software Control Board (ASCB), where these SCRs were 
presented and approved. 
From August 2013-May 2014, the development and testing of the AMO-EXPRESS Timeliner Bundles occurred.  
After development and successful testing of AMO-EXPRESS, the approvals from various ISS 
Board/Management/Panels for AMO-EXPRESS had to be done sequentially, so beginning in May 2014 and ending 
in October 2014, AMO-EXPRESS presented and received approval from the various ISS 
Boards/Management/Panels:  Presented the AMO-EXPRESS Timeliner Bundles/Overview to the Timeliner 
Operations Review Panel (TORP), and received an approval for Timeliner Operations.   Presented the AMO-
EXPRESS Timeliner Bundles/Overview to the ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP), and received a “GO” for AMO-
EXPRESS.  The AMO-EXPRESS Timeliner Bundles/Overview was presented to the Payload Software Control 
Panel (PSCP), and received approval for AMO-EXPRESS and approval to proceed to the Avionics Software 
Control Board (ASCB) for review of AMO-EXPRESS.  The AMO-EXPRESS Timeliner Bundles/Overview was 
presented to the MSFC Auto Procedure Control Panel (APCP), and received approval to proceed to submit an 
Engineering Change Request (ECR) to the Payload Operations Data File Control Board (PODFCB) for the uplink of 
the AMO-EXPRESS Operations Timeliner Bundles.  Once the ECR was approved, the AMO-EXPRESS Overview 
was presented at the POIF Management Meeting, and received no issues or concerns.  The AMO-EXPRESS 
Operations Overview was presented to the Avionics Software Control Board (ASCB) with no issues or concerns and 
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received a “GO” to proceed.  An Operations Change Request (OCR) was submitted after the ASCB meeting for the 
execution of the AMO-EXPRESS Operations.  After the approval of the OCR, a Flight Note was issued for the 
AMO-EXPRESS Timeliner File Uplink, and the AMO-EXPRESS Summary was presented to the ISS Operations 
Tagup (Ops Tag) prior to execution of AMO-EXPRESS.   This expedition through the ISS approval process from 
conception to on-orbit operations took 22 months. 
 
VI.         REAL-TIME EXECUTION 
Initial status of EXPRESS Rack 7: Powered, all payload locations un-powered, EXPRESS Laptop (ELC) was 
powered, flow rate set-point 77 Kg/Hr. PRO closed upper payload leg valve that supports MERLIN 5 cooling before 
operations. 
GMT 308:15:00:47 
PRO Installed two Bundles: AP_AMOE_PLSS and AP_AMOE_RACK 
 
Run #1 Rack Deactivation, Single Action 
 
GMT 308:15:32:40 
PRO commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_DEACTIVATION 
 Verified all payloads un-powered 
 Verified all payload comm deactivated 
Verified upper and lower payload leg valves are closed 
 Verified retrieval drive (EMU) 
 Commanded Lap Top Shutdown  
 Commanded Smoke Detector Monitoring inhibited 
 Commanded Rack Shutdown 
 Verified Health and Status data inactive 
 Verified the Main RPC State 
 Commanded Main RPC Open (remove power) 
 Verified RFCA State 
 Commanded RFCA to TEST State 
 Monitored Flow Rate 
The sequence’s Flow Rate range was too tight and needs to be changed to a simple low value 
check. There were no impacts to the operations. 
Verified Polling stopped and verified HAL6 was in execution. If HAL6 were not in execution, this 
sequence would have performed Shutdown Notification commanding and I/O inhibit commanding, but was 
not needed. 
 
Run #2 Step wise EXPRESS Rack 7 Activation 
 
GMT 308:15:52:23 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_THERMAL 
 Verified RFCA Software in execution. 
 Verified RFCA State is in IDLE State 
 Verified RFCA to Flow Mode State 
 Commanded RFCA Flow Set-Point to 50 Kg/Hr 
 Commanded RFCA to Closed Loop Control 
 Monitored the Flow Rate 
Flow Rate was obtained, and began monitoring the valve speed. 
 Verified Valve Speed of zero (not moving) 
 Commanded RFCA to IDLE State (Flow Rate Nominal) 
GMT 308:15:56:42 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_POWER 
Verified PLMDM Polling and I/O enablement (HAL6 Actions) 
Verified the Rack Power Switch is in the ON position 
 Verified the RPCM State (Operational) 
 Verified the Main and AUX RPC States (Open) 
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 Verified Main RPC not Close Inhibited 
Commanded Main RPC Close for Lab A Port 2 location 
 Verified PLMDM Health and Status Polling Started and Active 
GMT 308:15:57:47 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_PLSS.SDMON_ENABLE 
 Verified Obscuration Value 
 Verified Scatter Value 
Calculated the % Trip Value within Enablement Range 
Commanded Smoke Detector Enable 
Verified Smoke Detector Enabled and BIT Check passed. 
GMT 308:15:58:58 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_RACK.AMOE_INIT_DRIVES 
 Monitored Boot Loader Active 
 Monitored for Health and Status received 
Verified Retrieval Drive (EMU, which is currently in a failed state) 
 Commanded Laptop Power up 
Laptop did not power on when commanded (command was potentially sent too soon after boot or 
MAC address was word swapped, we need to investigate) 
TELEMTRY_CHECK Sequence executed autonomously 
Verified the state of the rack and which configuration files were loaded or not loaded. 
TELEMETRY_CHECK sequence directed MANUAL_CONFIGURATION Sequence execution. 
GMT 308:16:12:13 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_RACK.AMOE_MANUAL_CONFIG 
Verified the MCC heartbeat was incrementing and nominal. 
Verified each of the 7 configuration files were loaded.  For each configuration file that was not loaded, the 
manual configuration sequence commanded the RIC to the proper configuration. Because the rack did not 
have a retrieval drive available there were no configuration files that loaded. 
Commanded each locker location configuration (8 lockers and 2 drawers) 
Commanded the telemetry configuration for 2 payloads (GLACIER 4 and 5) 
GMT 308:16:21:24 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_RACK.AMOE_ACT_CLOSEOUT 
Verified the state of the rack and commanded the Rack to operate mode 
Commanded each of the 7 transmit statuses to the ground 
Verified the thermal configuration to insure proper water flow through the rack and it failed the range 
check and halted execution.  The rack ranges were acceptable and PRO resumed the sequence. 
Verified all LAN and Sonic processing values were correct 
Verified the AAA fan motor speed was in an acceptable range. 
Verified all heartbeats (4) were incrementing and nominal. 
 
Run #3 Rack Deactivation, Single Action 
 
GMT 308:17:13:23 
PRO commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_DEACTIVATION 
 Verified all payloads un-powered 
 Verified all payload comm deactivated 
Verified upper and lower payload leg valves are closed 
 Verified retrieval drive (EMU) 
 Commanded Lap Top Shutdown  
 Commanded Smoke Detector Monitoring inhibited 
 Commanded Rack Shutdown 
 Verified Health and Status data inactive 
 Verified the Main RPC State 
 Commanded Main RPC Open (remove power) 
 Verified RFCA State 
 Commanded RFCA to TEST State 
 Monitored Flow Rate 
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The sequence’s Flow Rate range was too tight and needs to be changed to a simple low value 
check. There were no impacts to the operations. 
Verified Polling stopped and verified HAL6 was in execution. If HAL6 were not in execution, this 
sequence would have performed Shutdown Notification commanding and I/O inhibit commanding, but was 
not needed. 
 
Run #4 EXPRESS Rack 7 Activation, Single Action 
 
GMT 308:17:51:24 
PRO Commanded the Start Sequence of AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_ACTIVATE_EXPRESS7 
(This sequence autonomously starts all other sequences based upon their status returns) 
Commanded Start Sequence AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_THERMAL 
 Verified RFCA Software in execution. 
 Verified RFCA State is in IDLE State 
 Commanded RFCA to Flow Mode State 
Verified RFCA Flow Set Point at 50 Kg/Hr (set from previous Run #2) 
 Commanded RFCA to Closed Loop Control 
 Monitored the Flow Rate 
Flow Rate was obtained, and began monitoring the valve speed. 
 Verified Valve Speed of zero (not moving) 
Commanded RFCA to IDLE State (Flow Rate Nominal) 
Commanded Start Sequence AP_AMOE_PLSS.AMOE_POWER 
Verified PLMDM Polling and I/O enablement (HAL6 Actions) 
Verified the Rack Power Switch is in the ON position 
 Verified the RPCM State (Operational) 
 Verified the RPC State (Open) 
 Verified Main RPC not Close Inhibited 
Commanded Main RPC Close for Lab A Port 2 location 
Verified PLMDM Health and Status Polling Started and Active 
Commanded Start Sequence AP_AMOE_PLSS.SDMON_ENABLE 
 Verified Obscuration Value 
 Verified Scatter Value 
Calculated the % Trip Value within Enablement Range 
Commanded Smoke Detector Enable 
Verified Smoke Detector Enabled and BIT check passed. 
Commanded Start Sequence AP_AMOE_RACK.AMOE_INIT_DRIVES 
 Monitored Boot Loader Active 
 Monitored for Health and Status received 
Verified Retrieval Drive (EMU, which is currently in a failed state) 
 Commanded Laptop Power up 
Laptop did not power when commanded (command was potentially sent too soon after boot or 
MAC address was word swapped, we need to investigate) 
TELEMTRY_CHECK Sequence executed autonomously 
Verified the state of the rack and which configuration files were loaded or not loaded. 
TELEMETRY_CHECK sequence directed MANUAL_CONFIGURATION Sequence execution. 
Commanded Start Sequence AP_AMOE_RACK.AMOE_MANUAL_CONFIG 
Verified the MCC heartbeat was incrementing and nominal. 
Verified each of the 7 configuration files were loaded.  For each configuration file that was not 
loaded, the manual configuration sequence commanded the RIC to the proper configuration. 
Because the rack did not have a retrieval drive available there were no configuration files that 
loaded and the sequence issued all the commands necessary to put the rack in a nominal 
configuration. 
Commanded Start Sequence AP_AMOE_RACK.AMOE_ACT_CLOSEOUT 
Verified the state of the rack and commanded the Rack to operate mode 
Commanded each of the 7 transmit statuses to the ground 
Verified the thermal configuration to insure proper water flow through the rack and it passed the 
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range check on this occurrence. The rack ranges were acceptable. 
Verified all LAN and Sonic processing values were correct 
Verified the AAA fan motor speed was in an acceptable range. 
Verified all heartbeats (4) were incrementing and nominal. 
GMT 308:18:23:18 
PRO Commanded Timeliner Bundle Removal’s (2 bundles) 
GMT 308:18:23:51 
PRO Commanded Timeliner Bundle Deletions (4 Files, executables and address map files) and 
verified. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, real-time execution of the sequences onboard was initiated by an operator on the ground 
with the WebPD application following the execution status.  The progress of the sequences were monitored from 
both the HOSC at Marshall Spaceflight Center, and also from Johnson Space Center. The WebPD application is 
dependent upon a packet of predefined data downlinked from ISS via Ku-Band. The data is forwarded to WebPD 
from the HOSC utilizing the GSE Operations capability within the Enhanced HOSC System (EHS). AMO defined 
the data to be downlink and the Timeliner Sequences populated messages, status return codes and active/inactive 
status within this downlink. The Timeout feature of WebPD made it appear that the procedure was in error before 
execution actually begun. The procedure is also expecting to be executed in step order, which did not occur due to 
the powered state of EXPRESS 7. There were large time breaks between status return codes, which left the user 
“wondering” what was currently in operation. After the first de-activation and sub-sequent activation. WebPD was 
initialized for a clean run prior to the second de-activation and first single action activation. AMO left WebPD in 
execution and did not initiate a WebPD procedure start. This allowed WebPD to simply follow and display the status 
returns codes. Below in figure 3 and 4 are the WebPD results of Run #3. Since WebPD was not started, ERROR 
frames were not generated on the display. Overall, WebPD followed each step whether in step order or not and 
correctly interpreted the status return codes from the Timeliner sequences. The next step in AMO EXPRESS 
operations will have the real-time execution of the sequences being initiated from WebPD on-board by the crew.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 WeBPD Real-Time Results 
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Figure 4 WeBPD Real-Time Results 
 
VII.         SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
The successful development and implementation of intelligent auto-procedures has proven that a significant 
spacecraft control function can be transferred from ground to onboard. More important, the demonstration shows 
that this function can be automated without incurring a significant increase of crew tended manual procedures. The 
single action activation and deactivation of the facility rack EXPRESS 7 shows that the current paradigm of console 
operator command procedures being duplicated by on-board auto-procedures can render the manual procedure to be 
obsolete. This is especially true when the single action combines the procedure operations of multiple console 
positions. If a command procedure and its volume of steps can be reduced to a single step, the result is a single step 
procedure, which essentially becomes a single button function and no longer in the “procedure” realm at the 
operations level.  
The next question becomes how much information is required to be delivered to the crew during the autonomous 
execution of the function and the content of this execution status. The AMO EXPRESS experiment will eventually 
lead to the crew having the capability to initialize and power a facility class rack, which is a capability they do not 
have today. Figure 5 depicts a notional EXPRESS rack operations panel that provides the crew with single action 
EXPRESS activation. The panel is scrolled to uncover the complete suite of EXPRESS racks and each EXPRESS 
segment provides for the current status of the rack as well as all the messaging from the auto-procedures that 
perform the activation functions. An equivalent De-activation panel would be required to encompass both activation 
and de-activation. 
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Figure 5. Notional EXPRESS Activation Panel 
 
During AMO EXPRESS operations, the auto-procedures produced ASCII messages for operator viewing and the 
messages essentially detailed what the auto-procedures were performing and encountering. Is this enough 
information to the crew? Is a drill down capability to lower level displays or procedure sub-steps needed? Or is a 
drill down to a detailed maintenance procedure needed when anomalies occur that the auto-procedures were not 
programmed to correct or recover from? During development of AMO EXPRESS, we encountered varying ways to 
display and control EXPRESS rack operations, from the in use today PRO displays and commands, to the WebPD 
procedure display, the Auto-Procedures Ground Management Tool HOSC application that controls Timeliner 
operations directly, test displays used for direct telemetry value viewing, network packet displays used for viewing 
raw data downlinked via Ku-Band, and this notional panel display. Each provides a different view of the same 
operations but which is best? Or are there parts of one display that combined with another provides the best 
information to the crew? This is part of a current study for determination. The results will most certainly be 
interesting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
17 
 
 
Appendix A 
Acronym List 
 
 
 
 
AES   - Advanced Exploration Systems 
AMO  - Autonomous Mission Operations 
APCP  - Auto Procedure Control Panel 
APGMT  - Auto Procedure Ground Management Tool 
ASCB  - Avionics Software Control Board  
ASCII  - American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
BAD  - Broadcast Ancillary Data 
CEF  - Change Evaluation Form 
CCSDS - Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 
CMG  - Control Moment Gyro 
CNCMDM - Command and Control Multiplexer De-multiplexer 
CRC  - Command Request Commands 
DMC  - Data Management Coordinators 
ECLSS - Environmental Control and Life Support Systems 
EIWG  - (ISS) Engineering Integration Working Group 
EHS  - Enhanced HOSC System 
EMU  - EXPRESS Memory Unit 
EPC   - EHS PC 
ESCP  - EXPRESS Software Control Panel 
ETHOS - JSC Console Position 
EXPRESS - Expedite the Processing of Experiments for Space Station 
FEU  - Functionally Equivalent Unit 
GCP  - Ground Control Procedure 
GSE  - Ground Support Equipment 
H&S  - Health and Status 
HAL  - Higher Active Logic 
HSIL  - Hardware/Software Integration Lab 
HMCG - HOSC Management Control Group  
HOSC  - Huntsville Operations Support Center 
HTML - Hypertext Markup Language 
IP  - Internet Protocol 
IPL   - Integrated Payload List 
ISPR  - International Standard Payload Rack 
ISS  - International Space Station  
ISTAR  - ISS as a Testbed for Analog Research 
ITR  - Integrated Test Rig 
JSC  - Johnson Space Center 
JOP  - Joint Operations Panel 
MCC   - Mission Control Center 
MDM  - Multiplexer De-multiplexer 
MSFC  - Marshall Space Flight Center 
NEO  - Near Earth Object 
NRT  - Near Real Time 
OCR  - Operations Change Request 
PAD  - Payload Ancillary Data 
PEHG  - Payload Ethernet Hub Gateway 
PEP   - Payload Executive Processor 
PCS   - Personal Computer System 
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PIMS  - Payload Information Management System 
PLMDM - Payload Multiplexer De-multiplexer 
POD  - Payload Operations Director 
PODFCB  - Payload Operations Data File Control Board 
POIC  - Payload Operations Integration Center 
POIF  - Payload Operations Integration Function 
PPL  - Pre Positioned Loads 
PRL   - Procedure Representation Language 
PRO  - Payload Rack Officer 
PRCU  - Payload Rack Checkout Unit 
PSIVF - Payload Software Integration and Verification Facility 
PUI  - Program Unique Identifier 
RFCA  - Rack Flow Control Assembly 
RIC  - Rack Interface Computer 
RPC  - Rack Power Controller 
RPCM - Rack Power Controller Module 
RPWG - Research Program Working Group 
SCR  - Software Change Request 
SCRCP - (ISS) Software Change and Schedule Review Panel 
SDIL  - Software Development and Integration Laboratory 
SRP  - (ISS) Safety Review Panel 
SSC  - Station Support Computer 
TORP  - Timeliner Operations Review Panel 
UDP  - User Datagram Protocol 
WebPD - Web –Based Procedure Display 
XML  - Extensible Markup Language 
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